Recipient verification

How it works

Email match, a one-time code, or an account login are the usual checks. A link alone verifies possession of the URL, not identity. Verification adds a step and stops casual forwards.

A 30 MB report requires a code sent to the named inbox. A forwarded link asks the colleague for a code they never got. The named recipient types the code and downloads. The log stores the address, not only the IP.

How it differs

Verification is not encryption. It decides who. TLS hides the path.

A code in the same mail as the link is only a speed bump.

Send the code as a separate message if you can.

On the ticket

• The practical close is a log line: time, actor, byte count, result.
• Without that line the transfer is a story.
• With it, the next person can see whether this door did what the ticket claimed.
• If the path is shared, say so in the partner profile so a later change does not silently pick a different limit, key, or region.
• On a real ticket, write down the door, the byte count, and the clock.
• For recipient verification, that means naming the host or bucket, the expected size, and the time the other side must have a complete file.
• A progress bar is not that record.
• A 200 response that arrives before the complete call is not that record.
• If a retry is allowed, say how many and whether it resumes.
• If a person must approve the send, name the person.
• Partners who receive recipient verification files should match on hash or size before they import.
• A same-length corrupt file passes a size check and fails a hash.
• Keep the published hash off the only channel an attacker can edit, or treat it as a corruption check rather than a substitution check.
• When the path changes, new key, new region, new cap, update the profile the same day so the next run does not use a stale limit.